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Abstract
This article addresses the relationship between two pri-
mary structural features of the 1951 Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees—that many benefits under it 
accrue on the basis of a refugee’s degree of attachment to 
his or her host state and that many rights under the con-
vention are guaranteed to a refugee only to the extent that 
they are enjoyed by a particular reference group—and the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ 
article 26 equality guarantee. Specifically, it examines 
whether attachment contingencies and reference groups, 
when incorporated in the refugee laws of states party to the 
ICCPR, might run afoul of article 26.
Résumé
Cet article examine les liens dialectiques entre deux prin-
cipes essentiels du régime général des réfugiés. Il s’agit du 
principe d’attachement et de groupe de référence prévus 
par la Convention de 1951 sur le Statut des réfugiés et de 
l’égalité devant la loi telle que garantie par l’article 26 du 
Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques de 
1966 (PIRCP). L’étendue des droits garantis par le régime 
conventionnel dépend du degré d’attachement du réfugié 
à son pays d’accueil et de la reconnaissance de ces droits 
au groupe de référence. Plus précisément, l’article ana-
lyse les conflits potentiels entre les garanties offertes par 
le régime général du PIRCP et la réception du principe de 
contingence et de groupe de référence dans les droits natio-
naux des Etats parties.
1 Introduction
This article addresses the relationship between two pri-mary yet often overlooked structural features of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,1 on 
the one hand, and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights’2 (ICCPR) article 26 equality guarantee, 
on the other. The first feature of the 1951 convention at issue 
is that many rights under it accrue on the basis of the refu-
gee’s degree of attachment to the host state. In other words, 
whether a refugee is entitled to certain rights under the 
convention depends on the nature of his or her stay in the 
country of asylum. The 1951 convention includes five types 
of presence in the host state: mere jurisdictional control, 
physical presence, lawful presence, lawful stay, and habitual 
residence. The second feature of the 1951 convention at issue 
is that many rights under it are guaranteed to refugees only 
to the extent that a particular reference group also enjoys 
the right in question. The convention includes three refer-
ence groups: aliens generally in the same circumstances, 
most-favoured foreigners, and citizens. 
This article examines whether attachment contingen-
cies and reference groups, when reflected in the domestic 
refugee legislation of states party to the ICCPR, might be 
inconsistent with that instrument’s article 26 equality provi-
sion. It does not, however, attempt to apply ICCPR article 
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26 equality analysis to the differential allocation of a par-
ticular right as between different groups of refugees, or to 
rights guaranteed to refugees at a standard lower than that 
enjoyed by nationals or other aliens, because such analysis 
is entirely dependent on particular facts: the right at issue 
and the nature of the unequal treatment suffered. Even if 
facts were invented for the sake of hypothetical analysis, the 
resulting conclusion would be no more than speculative 
because the Human Rights Committee (HRC)—the ICCPR 
treaty-monitoring body—has never applied article 26 scru-
tiny to a state party’s domestic refugee law. What this article 
does do, however, is deconstruct the 1951 convention’s system 
of attachment contingencies and reference groups, explain 
the scope of the ICCPR article 26 equality guarantee, and 
highlight that this guarantee applies to the 1951 convention 
system of attachment contingencies and reference groups 
when these are reflected in the refugee laws of states party 
to the ICCPR. This is with a view to encouraging refugee 
advocates to consider article 26 among the arsenal of legal 
arguments available for the advance of refugees’ rights.
The article begins with a more detailed explanation of the 
1951 convention’s attachment criteria and its reference group 
approach, enumerating the rights subject to each contin-
gency, and then demonstrating how certain rights are dually 
contingent. This is followed by an overview of ICCPR article 
26 and the criteria set by the HRC to determine when dif-
ferential allocations of rights run afoul of the provision. The 
article’s fourth section then argues that the 1951 convention’s 
reference group approach and its attachment criteria could 
each reasonably be found to be incompatible with ICCPR 
article 26 when such an approach and criteria are reflected 
in domestic laws. It also notes that the ICCPR’s and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’3 (ICESCR) common accessory non-discrimination 
provision prohibits distinctions between refugees and 
nationals, and among refugees, in respect of rights also pro-
tected by one of the covenants. A concluding section briefly 
contemplates the systemic implications of the analysis for 
the 1951 convention and its domestic counterparts. 
In should be noted at the outset that in developed coun-
tries, refugees are rarely accorded a particular package of 
rights based on the 1951 convention; refugee legislation in 
developed countries does not usually follow the 1951 conven-
tion’s contingent rights framework. Canada’s Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act,4 for example, does not address 
refugee rights. Refugees’ rights are protected in general by 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,5 which applies 
to every person in Canada,6 and certain rights and/or bene-
fits are the subject of specific laws and/or policies, such as 
the Interim Federal Health Program in the case of medical 
care for asylum seekers and refugees recently resettled to 
Canada. In some developing countries, by contrast, refugee 
legislation follows the 1951 convention’s rights framework 
exactly. Ghana’s Refugee Law, 1992 is an example. The act’s 
rights framework mirrors the 1951 convention, providing 
simply that a “person granted refugee status in Ghana shall 
be entitled to the rights and be subject to the duties specified 
in (a) … [the 1951 convention]; (b) the Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees of 1967 …, and (c) the Organisation of 
African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects 
of Refugee Problems in Africa.”7 These three international 
instruments are then attached to the Ghanaian act as sched-
ules. The issue this article addresses is salient only in states 
such as Ghana, which approach refugee rights in line with 
the 1951 convention. 
It should be further noted that nothing in this article 
should be taken to suggest that a treaty can invalidate an 
earlier international instrument with which it is incompat-
ible. In other words, the incompatibility between the 1951 
convention and the ICCPR suggested here should not be 
taken to imply that ICCPR article 26 invalidates the 1951 
convention’s contingent rights framework. Nothing in 
international law suggests that such is possible. Moreover, 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties contains a 
framework for the resolution of such conflicts (though it is 
usually applied to conflicting bilateral instruments).8 Rather, 
this article is about the effect in ICCPR states parties of that 
instrument’s article 26 on domestic refugee laws that follow 
the 1951 convention framework.
2 The 1951 Convention
The 1951 convention is the international treaty relating to 
qualification for and disqualification from refugee status, 
and to refugee rights. Unlike international human rights 
law, most rights under the 1951 convention are not univer-
sally guaranteed. While article 3 of the 1951 convention pro-
hibits discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, and 
country of origin, and the convention’s article 5 clarifies 
that nothing in it impairs any right granted by any other 
law, most 1951 convention rights are themselves dependent 
on the nature of the refugee’s presence in the asylum state 
and on the standards of treatment enjoyed by other groups 
in the host state. Each of these two features of the conven-
tion is discussed in turn.
Hathaway explains that the 1951 convention’s attachment 
criteria represent an attempt to make rights contingent upon 
the strength of the bond between a refugee and his or her 
host state.9 He explains this “assimilative path”:10 “While 
all refugees benefit from a number of core rights, additional 
entitlements accrue as a function of the nature and duration 
of the attachment to the asylum state.… Before any given 
rights can be claimed by a particular refugee, the nature 
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of his or her attachment to the host state must therefore be 
defined. The structure of the attachment system is incremen-
tal: because the levels build on one another,… rights once 
acquired are retained for the duration of refugee status.”11
Usually, a refugee will become subject to the host state’s 
jurisdiction at the same time as he or she becomes physically 
present in, or enters, the country of asylum. However, one 
can think of exceptional instances in which jurisdictional 
control precedes entry. For example, Edward Snowden was 
arguably subject to Russian jurisdiction during the 40 days 
he spent in Sheremetyevo Airport before officially crossing 
the border there. Physical presence is established as soon 
as the refugee is within host state territory. The contours 
of “lawful presence” are less straightforward. Hathaway 
addresses them in depth.12 For the purposes of this article, 
it is sufficient to note that lawful presence certainly refers to 
“the stage between ‘irregular’ presence and the recognition or 
denial of refugee status, including the time required for any 
appeals or reviews.”13 “Lawfully staying” is also complex;14 
for our purposes, it suffices to note that lawful stay is charac-
terised by “officially sanctioned, ongoing presence in a state 
party, whether or not there has been a formal declaration of 
refugee status, grant of the right of permanent residence, or 
establishment of domicile there.”15 Habitual residence is gen-
erally achieved when the refugee has lived in the host state 
for a statutorily defined continuous period of time.16 In sum, 
“some rights apply simply once a state has jurisdiction over a 
refugee; others by virtue of physical presence in a state’s ter-
ritory, even if illegal; a third set when that presence is either 
officially sanctioned or tolerated; further rights accrue once 
the refugee has established more than a transient or interim 
presence in the asylum state; and even the most demanding 
level of attachment requires only a period of de facto con-
tinuous and legally sanctioned residence.”17 
All 1951 convention rights are categorized according to 
their related attachment criteria in table 1.18 In the column 
headings, “Subject to jurisdiction” and “Physical presence” 
are bracketed because they represent a very low bar to the 
enjoyment of rights; indeed, it would be nonsensical to 
guarantee a right to a refugee not subject to host state juris-
diction. Nevertheless, they are included in the table in order 
to exhaustively deconstruct 1951 convention rights accord-
ing to attachment criteria. 
The 1951 convention’s attachment criteria are the first of 
two ways in which most rights under that instrument are 
contingent. The second is its system of reference groups. 
Again, Hathaway’s explanation is instructive. He notes 
that the standard for compliance with rights under the 1951 
convention “varies as a function of the relevant treatment 
afforded another group under the laws and practices of the 
receiving country. Under these contingent rights standards, 
refugees are entitled to be assimilated either to nationals of 
Table 2: Rights guaranteed to a standard below national 
treatment 
Art 13 property rights 
Art 15 right of association 
Art 17 wage employment 
Art 18 self-employment
Art 19 liberal professions 
Art 21 housing 
Art 22(2) public secondary education 
Art 26 freedom of movement and residence 
[Subject to jurisdiction] [Physical presence] Lawful presence Lawful stay Habitual residence
Art 3 
non-discrimination
Art 4 freedom of 
religion
Art 18 self-employment Art 15 right of 
association
Art 7(2) exemption from 
legislative reciprocity
Art 13 property rights Art 25 administrative 
assistance
Art 26 freedom of 
movement and 
residence 
Art 17 wage 
employment
Art 14 artistic and 
industrial property
Art 16(1) access to 
courts
Art 27 identity 
documents
Art 32 protection from 
expulsion
Art 19 liberal 
professions 
Art 16(2) legal aid and 
exemption from cautio 
judicatum solvi
Art 20 rationing Art 31 no penalization 
for unlawful entry
Art 21 housing Art 17(2) exemption 
from labour market 
restrictions
Art 22 public education Art 23 public relief 
Art 29 fiscal charges Art 24 labour legislation 
and social security 
Art 33 non-refoulement Art 28 travel document 
Art 34 naturalization
Table 1: 1951 Convention rights categorized by attachment criterion
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a most-favoured state, or to citizens of the asylum state itself. 
If no absolute or contingent standard is specified for a given 
right, refugees benefit from the usual standard of treatment 
applied to non-citizens present in the asylum state.”19 
This system “clearly presumes the legitimacy of treating 
refugees less favourably than citizens with respect to any of 
the rights defined by a contingent standard less than nation-
ality.”20 Those 1951 convention rights for which the refer-
ence group, and hence the standard of treatment, is below 
national treatment are listed in table 2.
Taken together, the 1951 convention’s attachment criteria 
and its reference groups create a system of dual contingen-
cies on certain refugee rights. Such rights are subject to both 
an attachment criterion and a reference group standard. 
This is represented in the contingency table (table 3).21 Each 
right in the table is subject to the attachment criterion in 
the column heading above it, and the same right is guar-
anteed only to the extent that the reference group named 
in the stub heading to the left also enjoys it. For example, 
under the 1951 convention, only refugees lawfully staying in 
the host state enjoy article 15 freedom of association, and 
the right is guaranteed to the standard enjoyed by the most 
favoured non-nationals in the host state. Again, “Subject to 
jurisdiction” and “Physical presence” are included for the 
sake of exhaustiveness; the brackets around these column 
headings indicate that these attachment criteria are a low 
bar to the enjoyment of rights. Similarly, national treatment 
is the highest standard of treatment and so does not repre-
sent a true contingency, as indicated by the brackets around 
it in the table; it is included for the sake of exhaustiveness.
When these reference groups and attachment criteria are 
incorporated into the domestic refugee laws of states party 
to the ICCPR, they may raise article 26 equality issues. This 
provision is discussed below. 
3 ICCPR Article 26
A threshold consideration is whether the ICCPR applies 
to non-nationals, including refugees. The language of the 
ICCPR is such that its rights are generally owed to “every-
one.” Moreover, the HRC has clarified that “the general 
rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be 
guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and 
aliens.”22 Thus refugees in their host countries enjoy ICCPR 
rights. 
The right at issue here is that to equality, which is given 
effect by states’ duty of non-discrimination. The legal duty of 
non-discrimination requires that the treatment accorded to 
individuals not be based on their status, group membership, 
or irrelevant physical characteristics.23 Article 26 of ICCPR 
articulates this duty with particular force because the ambit 
of the guarantee is not limited to the ICCPR alone;24 rather, 
it applies to the “allocation of all public goods, includ-
ing rights not stipulated by the Covenant itself.”25 Nowak 
explains through an example: the ICCPR “contains no pro-
vision granting a right to sit on a park bench. But when a 
state party exacts a law forbidding Jews or blacks from sit-
ting on public park benches, then this law violates Art. 26.”26 
Refugee rights are thus subject to ICCPR article 26,27 ren-
dering the international refugee convention as incorporated 
by ICCPR states parties justiciable by the HRC.28 
ICCPR article 26 provides that “[a]ll persons are equal 
before the law and are entitled without any discrimina-
tion to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the 
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all 
Table 3: Dual contingencies on 1951 Convention rights
[Subject to 
jurisdiction]
[Physical 
presence] Lawful presence Lawful stay Habitual residence
Aliens generally 
in the same 
circumstances
Art 13 property 
rights
Art 22(2) pub-
lic secondary 
education
— Art 18 
self-employment 
Art 26 freedom of 
movement and 
residence
Art 19 liberal 
professions 
Art 21 housing 
—
Most favoured 
foreigners
— — — Art 15 right of 
association 
Art 17 wage 
employment
—
[Nationals] Art 20 rationing
Art 22(1) public 
elementary 
education
Art 29 fiscal 
charges
Art 4 freedom of 
religion 
Art 25(4) fees for 
administrative 
assistance
 
— Art 23 public relief 
Art 24 labour legis-
lation and social 
security
Art 14 artistic 
and industrial 
property
Art 16(2) legal aid 
and exemption 
from cautio judi-
catum solvi
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persons equal and effective protection against discrimina-
tion on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”29 
This guarantee ensures both formal equality (equality 
before the law) and substantive equality (equal protection 
of the law). Thus “refugees … are entitled to invoke Art. 
26’s duty to avoid arbitrary allocations and its affirmative 
duty to bring about non-arbitrary allocations.”30 Article 
26 does not, however, establish an unconditional right to 
equality, because not every instance of differential treat-
ment amounts to discrimination.31 In many circumstances, 
it is perfectly reasonable for a state to differentiate between 
groups; affirmative action programs are the classic example. 
Rather, equality requires that any unequal treatment be 
“properly justified, according to consistently applied, per-
suasive, and acceptable criteria.”32 The classic statement of 
this principle was made by Justice Tanaka in his dissenting 
opinion in the South West Africa case.33 In the context of 
apartheid, Tanaka explained that differential treatment is 
permitted when it is just or reasonable, but justice and rea-
sonableness always preclude arbitrary distinctions. 
The HRC has accordingly read the following proviso into 
article 26: “[N]ot every differentiation of treatment will con-
stitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation 
are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a 
purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant.”34 Thus to 
amount to discrimination under ICCPR article 26, unequal 
treatment must be based on criteria that are neither reason-
able nor objective, nor in pursuit of a legitimate aim. Pobjoy 
has distilled this into a convenient three-pronged test for 
establishing unlawful discrimination:
1. Has there been differential treatment between indi-
viduals in similar circumstances? In other words, is 
there an inequality basis for a discrimination claim?
2. Is the unequal treatment based on a ground captured 
by art 26?
3. Is the unequal treatment based on “reasonable and 
objective” criteria?35
The section that follows considers the impact of the 1951 
convention’s reference group approach and whether it can 
be reconciled with ICCPR article 26.
4 The 1951 Convention and ICCPR Article 26
4.1 The 1951 Convention’s Reference Group Approach and 
ICCPR Article 26
The 1951 convention’s system of reference groups protects 
certain convention rights to a standard lower than that 
enjoyed by nationals and/or most-favoured foreigners. If this 
lesser treatment can be construed as resulting from refugees’ 
status as such, then article 26 is invoked. The applicable 
prohibited ground of discrimination is “other status,” 
which can be construed as including refugee status because 
the HRC generally interprets “other status” broadly,36 
and because it has understood the ground to include non- 
citizens.37 Indeed, Hathaway has noted that ICCPR article 
26 might “be a sufficient basis to require asylum states to 
bring an end to any laws or practices that set refugees apart 
from the rest of their community.”38 To determine whether 
an instance of discrimination is saved by the HRC’s proviso, 
one must apply Pobjoy’s test to the right at issue. 
There is, however, a more direct route to challenging 
below-national treatment than that provided by ICCPR arti-
cle 26, which has been highlighted by Hathaway.39 Both cov-
enants include an accessory non-discrimination provision. 
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR provides that “[e]ach State Party to 
the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdic-
tion the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.” Article 2(2) of the ICESCR 
provides substantively the same protection.
This article is subject to a similar proviso as ICCPR article 
26: distinctions “are prohibited as discriminatory only when 
they are not supported by reasonable and objective criteria.”40 
Yet in general terms, article 2(1)/2(2) effectively precludes dis-
crimination relative to citizens.41 It is accordingly “not neces-
sary to rely on the relevant refugee right in order to contest 
treatment below national treatment. Since virtually all rights 
in the Covenants must be implemented without discrimina-
tion between nationals and non-citizens, refugees who 
invoke the cognate Covenant protection can effectively avoid 
the lower standard of treatment prescribed by the Refugee 
Convention.”42 In respect of contingent 1951 convention 
rights also protected by the ICCPR or the ICESCR—article 15 
on rights of association, article 17 on wage employment, arti-
cle 18 on self-employment, article 21 on housing, article 22(2) 
on secondary education, and article 26 on freedom of move-
ment and residence43—refugees are thus entitled to national 
treatment unless the state can establish that treating refugees 
differently from nationals is reasonable. 
It should be noted, however, that the ICESCR permits 
that developing countries—where the majority of the world’s 
refugees are found—“with due regard to human rights 
and their national economy, may determine to what extent 
they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in 
the present Covenant to non-nationals.”44 Recourse to the 
ICESCR to raise less than national treatment in respect of 
economic rights is therefore most likely to be successful in 
developed states (where, as mentioned above, refugee rights 
are not usually contingent).45 Moreover, ICESCR rights are 
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not guaranteed on an absolute basis; the standard is one of 
progressive realization.46 Finally, and most importantly, 
non-citizens often face significant obstacles to the enjoyment 
of their rights, at international law as well as under municipal 
law. Detailing the jurisprudence in this regard is beyond the 
scope of this article, and others have in any case already con-
ducted such work.47 It suffices to note here that any reliance 
on the covenants to raise less than national treatment to the 
national standard will have to overcome several hurdles: the 
limit placed on their common accessory non-discrimination 
provision, the allowances made by the ICESCR for develop-
ing countries in terms of both economic rights and in terms of 
the standard for implementation, and more generally, nega-
tive jurisprudential trends. At the very least, the covenants’ 
common accessory non-discrimination provision represents 
an additional avenue through which to challenge less than 
national treatment of refugees in respect of rights also pro-
tected by the ICCPR or the ICESCR. Indeed, the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has explained that 
“the ground of nationality should not bar access to Covenant 
rights … The Covenant rights apply to everyone including 
non-nationals, such as refugees, asylum seekers.”48
In respect of those contingent 1951 convention rights 
found in neither the ICCPR nor the ICESCR—the rights 
to property (article 13) and to the practice of liberal profes-
sions (article 19)—the only approach to challenging less than 
national treatment is to subject the right at issue to Pobjoy’s 
test to determine whether distinction between refugees and 
nationals might impugn ICCPR article 26, the critical third 
prong of which employs the HRC’s proviso and asks whether 
less than national treatment can be said to be “reasonable and 
objective.” The results of the analysis will differ depending 
on the host country and right at issue;49 in the context of 
scarce resources, restricting socio-economic rights would 
likely be more easily justified than limiting civil and polit-
ical rights. For example, in the context of scarce resources, it 
may be “reasonable and objective” to protect the local labour 
market by prohibiting refugees from practising their profes-
sions. Discrimination in the protection of property rights, by 
contrast, would probably be less easily saved. 
Hathaway has noted three jurisprudential trends sug-
gesting that the HRC might be reluctant to find distinctions 
between non-nationals and citizens unreasonable. First, 
the HRC “has too frequently been prepared to recognize 
differentiation on the basis of certain categories, includ-
ing non-citizenship, as presumptively reasonable. Second 
and related, the Committee has paid insufficient attention 
to evidence that generally applicable standards may impact 
differently on differently situated groups … third and most 
generally, the … [HRC] routinely affords governments an 
extraordinarily broad margin of appreciation.”50
He concludes by noting that “non-discrimination law 
has not yet evolved to the point that refugees and other non- 
citizens can safely assume that it will provide a sufficient answer 
to the failure to grant them rights on par with citizens.”51 
This is not to say that the HRC has never referred to article 
26 in connection with non-citizens. In its 2003 Concluding 
Observations on Latvia, the HRC expressed “its concern 
over the perpetuation of a situation of exclusion, resulting 
in lack of effective enjoyment of many Covenant rights by 
the non-citizen segment of the population, including polit-
ical rights, the possibility to occupy certain State and public 
positions, the possibility to exercise certain professions in 
the private sector, restrictions in the area of ownership of 
agricultural land, as well as social benefits (art. 26).”52
Regarding refugees specifically, in its Concluding 
Observations on Germany, the HRC “warned that anti-
terrorism measures might create an ‘atmosphere of latent 
suspicion’ towards foreigners, in particular asylum-seekers, 
and referred to Article 26 in support of its observations.”53 
The HRC has never, however, applied article 26 scrutiny to 
a refugee law’s system of reference groups. Thus the current 
moment can most accurately be characterised “as one of legal 
uncertainty … until and unless the … [HRC] assesses the 
propriety of categorical differentiation based on citizenship 
… it will be difficult to know which forms of exclusion are 
likely to be found valid, and which are in breach of Art. 26.”54 
4.2 The 1951 Convention’s Attachment Criteria and ICCPR 
Article 26
As a result of the 1951 convention’s system of reference 
groups, refugees suffer differential treatment relative to 
citizens. The convention’s attachment criteria, by contrast, 
distinguish among different groups of refugees. Hathaway 
notes that the 1951 convention’s levels of attachment are also 
“subject to scrutiny under Art. 26 to ensure that the with-
holding of benefits from some refugees is justifiable.”55 Clark 
and Niessen have implied the same.56 Hathaway does not, 
however, pursue the point. Rather, his extensive analysis of 
discrimination among refugees is based on other criteria, 
such as refugees’ countries of origin.57 
To offend article 26, whether a refugee is subject to host 
state jurisdiction, physically present, lawfully present, law-
fully staying, or habitually resident would have to be found 
to fall within the provision’s final enumerated ground on 
which discrimination is prohibited: “other status.” Yet, as 
above, there is also a simpler solution. Because the coven-
ants protect everyone on state territory, refugees who are 
merely physically present have the benefit of those 1951 con-
vention rights that require lawful presence, stay, or habitual 
residence if such rights are also included in the ICCPR 
or, in some cases, in the ICESCR. In other words, certain 
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rights weakly protected in international refugee law bene-
fit from the complementarity of international human rights 
law. Accordingly, the 1951 convention’s rights to artistic and 
industrial property (article 14), of association (article 15) and 
access to courts (article 16(2)), and to self- and wage employ-
ment (articles 17 and 18), housing (article 21), and labour 
legislation and social security (article 24), which under 
international refugee law are guaranteed only to those law-
fully present, staying, or habitually resident, are by virtue of 
the ICCPR or ICESCR equally available to refugees physic-
ally present (and lawfully present, as applicable).58 
Note, however, that the degree of protection accorded 
under the relevant covenant will, of course, depend on the 
particular right at issue. For example, intellectual prop-
erty rights are protected only weakly under the ICESCR.59 
Moreover, as above, in developing countries the ICESCR 
article 2(3) caveat, and in general its standard of progres-
sive realisation, applies to 1951 convention rights contin-
gent upon lawful presence, stay, or habitual residence and 
also included in the ICESCR. More generally, the hurdles 
faced by non-citizens in the enjoyment of their rights apply 
equally in this context.60 
For the remaining rights—those 1951 convention rights 
dependent on strong attachment, which as refugee-specific 
rights feature in neither the ICCPR nor the ICESCR, or more 
general rights subject to limitations under these instruments—
the analysis to determine whether the 1951 convention’s 
attachment criteria approach contravenes ICCPR article 26 is 
as above: by application of Pobjoy’s test in context to differen-
tial allocations of rights as between different classes of refu-
gees. The rights susceptible to such analysis are listed in table 4.
On a normative basis at least, it has been argued that 
“while a State is exercising its jurisdiction over a person with 
respect to the determination of any one right, including the 
right to a status, the person should enjoy other rights to the 
extent possible.”62 Whether the ICCPR article 26 analysis 
will suggest the same will depend on the right, how it has 
been differentially protected, and the particular host coun-
try situation at issue. The HRC has never assessed whether 
a domestic refugee law featuring attachment criteria offends 
article 26. However, it should be noted that in his analysis 
of discrimination among refugees (on grounds other than 
their degree of attachment to the host state), Hathaway finds 
that ICCPR article 26 “has considerable value as a comple-
mentary prohibition of discrimination between classes of 
refugees in the allocation of a wide-ranging set of rights.”63 
5 Conclusion
This short article has deconstructed the system of attach-
ment criteria and reference groups that underlies the 1951 
convention. It has also highlighted that the ICCPR’s article 
Table 4: 1951 Convention rights with strong attachment 
criteria (> physical presence) and no international human 
rights law complementarity
Art 7(2) exemption from legislative reciprocity
Art 19 liberal professions 
Art 23 public relief 
Art 26 freedom of movement (ICCPR art 12 requires the 
person be “lawfully within” state party territory)61
Art 28 travel document 
Art 32 protection from expulsion (ICCPR art 13 requires 
the person be “lawfully in” state party territory)
26 applies to domestic refugee laws based on this system in 
states party to the ICCPR. It is hoped that this will encour-
age refugee advocates to consider article 26 among the tools 
available to them to advance refugee rights. Furthermore, 
it has emphasized that in respect of 1951 convention rights 
that are also protected by one of the covenants, their com-
mon accessory non-discrimination provision can raise less 
than national standards of treatment to the national level, 
provided that the distinction at issue is neither reasonable 
nor objective. The covenants similarly protect refugees who 
are merely physically present from a lower standard of treat-
ment than that accorded to more attached refugees. 
On a more systemic level, this article has highlighted a par-
ticular instance of a fairly common issue on the international 
plane: treaties can be inconsistent with earlier international 
instruments. In this case, ICCPR article 26 is inconsistent 
with the international refugee convention that came before it. 
Certainly, if the ICCPR had existed when the 1951 convention 
was drafted and adopted, the latter would have emerged as 
a completely different instrument, likely without its facially 
discriminatory system of reference groups and attachment 
criteria. Today, there is only one route through which these 
facets of the 1951 convention might be challenged: via its arti-
cle 38, which allows disputes over the interpretation or appli-
cation of the convention to be referred to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) by one of the parties to the dispute. 
Thus a state would have to view the 1951 convention’s refer-
ence groups and/or attachment criteria as untenable in view 
of ICCPR article 26, and would have to take the issue to the 
ICJ for resolution. However, it is unlikely that an article 38 
referral would ever occur, nor would it be desirable. The con-
vention’s reference groups and attachment criteria underlie 
almost the entire instrument; invalidating them would vir-
tually open the 1951 convention up for renegotiation, and in 
the current global climate any new refugee convention would 
surely be less generous than that adopted in 1951. 
On the municipal plane, this article has highlighted the 
relationship between ICCPR article 26 and domestic refugee 
 Contingent Rights Framework and Article 26 
11
laws that follow the 1951 convention’s rights framework. An 
interesting avenue for future research would be to examine 
what, if any, impact the ICCPR has had on national refugee 
laws adopted or amended after the state in question became 
party to the ICCPR. Uganda’s 2006 Refugees Act, for 
example, features no attachment criteria and only one ref-
erence group: “aliens generally in similar circumstances.”64 
Whether this was a result of the ICCPR is unclear, but 
Hansard and drafting committee records might be reveal-
ing in this regard. 
Whatever the effect of the ICCPR, at the very least it rep-
resents a litigation tool. It may also be used as a shield rather 
than as a sword, to borrow the metaphor usually applied 
to estoppel. Given the current state of HRC and municipal 
jurisprudence on the rights of non-nationals, the real poten-
tial of ICCPR article 26 in respect of the contingencies on 
refugees’ rights may lie in its potential as an interpretive 
tool to update our understanding of the 1951 convention. 
Under article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties,65 “relevant rules of international law applicable 
in the relations between the parties” are applicable in the 
interpretation of treaties. This expresses a more general 
principle of treaty interpretation: the systemic integration 
of the international legal system.66 According to this prin-
ciple, states and courts, in interpreting and applying the 1951 
convention (and perhaps domestic laws based on it), could 
consider ICCPR article 26, as well as international human 
rights law more generally.67 It is hoped that such considera-
tion will occur and that it will promote a generous inter-
pretation of refugees’ rights under the 1951 convention and 
its domestic equivalents.
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